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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN YOUNG and STELLA 
YOUNG, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
GEORGE BRIDWELL, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
10774 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants have appealed a Judgment of the 
District Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County, dismissing Appellants' action for mal-
practice and breach of contract against the Respon-
dent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Appellants filed suit against Respondent 
for breach of contract and malpractice as a lawyer. 
The Complaint alleged five alternative causes of 
aetion and sought $15,000.00 damages. An Answer 
wa~ filed and discovery processes followed. On 17 
March, 1966, pretrial was had before J uclge Joseph 
1 
G. Jeppson. Another pretrial was had April 5, 1966, ' 
and on 28 October, 1966 hearing was held before 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson who entered Judgment 
for the Respondent and dismissed Appellants' cause 
of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Judgment of the trial court should be af-
finned. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record in the instant case is composed of 
the pleadings and papers in the trial below and the 
record and pleadings in case number 132929, Mar-
v in C. Young, et al. vs. F. Hyde Mortensen, et al., , 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County.' 
The Appllants' Complaint alleged that the Re-
spondent had been employed as counsel for Appel-
lants to bring an action for breach of a lease, tl~ 1.rn­
ages, and for eviction and restoration of leased 
p1·emises ( R. 1). It was alleged that the Appellants 
had hired Respondent personally and exclusively 
( R. 2). It was alleged that Appellants had a cause 
of action against Respondent because he did not 
personally represent them as they had contracted ' 
in the case of Marvin C. Young, et al. vs. F. Hyde ' 
Mortensen, et al. (R. 1-3). The Complaint set forth 
five alternative claims for relief ( R. 1) ; however, 
'The record of that case will be cited by using the prefix A. 
Page citations will not be cited since they are not numbered 
by the clerk. 
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the Appellants now contend that the trial court 
erred on two grounds so that consideration of all 
the issues of the Complaint is not necessary for de-
termination of this appeal. 
Marvin and Stella D. Young filed lawsuit 
against F. Hyde Mortensen, et al. (A. 1) . They 
discharged their original counsel before trial (A) 
and employed Respondent. A Notice of Readiness 
for Trial was filed by Alan D. Frandsen, an attor-
ney associated with Respondent. Respondent pro-
ceeded to prosecute the suit which involved a dis-
pute over a lease (A). The lease agreement which 
was the subject of the litigation was for five years, 
from August 6, 1957 to August 6, 1962 (A attach-
ment to Complaint). The lawsuit was pre-tried 
before Judge A. H. Ellett November 30, 1962, after 
the expiration of the original term of the disputed 
lease ( R. 10). Prior to the expiration of the lease, 
the Defendants Mortensen served Notice on the 
Youngs of their intention to renew the lease at the 
same rental (A). Thereafter, Mortensens paid 
$150.00 per month to Youngs, which was accepted. 
The lease, however, had a clause calling for renewal 
of the lease at a negotiated figure and Youngs sent 
a letter prior to expiration calling for $450.00 per 
month (A). 
At the time of pretrial November 30, 1962, 
Alan D. Frandsen appeared as attorney for the 
Youngs. An additional issue was raised at pretrial 
as to whether the payment of the $150.00 per month 
3 
by the Mortensens after the expiration of the lease 
' I and the acceptance of those payments by the Youngs 1 
wol'ked to renew the lease. The pretrial order re-
flects the fallowing ( R. 10) : 
"3. Since the 10th day of August, 1962, I 
the defendants have regularly paid to the I 
Plaintiffs the sum of $150.00 per month, and 1 
the Plaintiffs have accepted the same towards 
payment of rent. 
(THE COURT: Mr. Frandsen, you say 
that you don't know about other payments 
but that the Plaintiff did accept the first pay-
ment after August 10, 1962? 
MR. FRANDSEN: I believe so." 
The Pre-Trial Judge then ruled (R. 10) : 
"The court will hold as a matter of law 1 
that there has been a renewal of the lease on 
the same terms as heretofore existed; that the 
acceptance of the payment of the rent after 
the exercise of the option would constitute a 
renewal of the lease for a period of five years 
as contained in the option within the lease." ' 
At the trial January 7, 1963, before Judge 
Ellett, the appellants were represented by Alan D. 
Frandsen (Tr. of A-p.1). No objection to Mr. 
Frandsen's representation of the Youngs was ever 
voiced by them (Tr. of A). Ml'. Frandsen again 
challenged the court's ruling made at pre-trial (Tr. 
of A-p.1, 2). Further, the court dismissed Mr. 
Young's action as he did not have an interest in the 
4 
leased premises (Tr. of A-p.16)." The trial court, 
after hearing the evidence, ruled Mrs. Young had 
no cause of action, and awarded the Mortensens 
judgment on their Counterclaim (A). No appeal 
was taken from that judgment. The judgment en-
tered February 26, 1963 does not recite that the 
lease was renewed at the same rate that was in force 
but only dismissed the Plaintiffs' Complaint "no 
cause of action" and awarded the Defendants 
$340.09, the amount requested in their Counterclaim 
(A). The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
did conclude that receipt of payment of rental oper-
ated as a waiver of the Plaintiff's right to negotiate 
a new rental and the lease was renewed for fi\·e 
years (A); however, its relevance absent a judg-
ment was apparently only the Appellants' claim of 
a right to rescind. Subsequently, Youngs' Motion 
for new trial was made with different counsel. It 
does not appear what disposition was made of this 
Motion, but it was apparently denied. 
At pretrial in the instant action, the court rul-
ed there was no evidence of any negligence on the 
part of Mr. Frandsen ( R. 25). At the hearing, the 
trial court concluded that an appeal in Civil No. 
182929 would have been of "no avail" ( R. 35). 
The only issues raised on appeal, as the basis 
for reversal, are: ( 1) That the court erred in not 
'i\fr. Young is not properly a party to this action or this 
appeal, and was stricken as a party Plaintiff in the instant 
action ( R. 23). 
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considering the Appellants' breach of c o n tr act \ 
theory, and (2) The Court erred in ruling the re-
sults would not have been different on appeal. 3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN R E J E C T I N G APPELLANTS 
THEORY OF BREACH OF CONTRACT: 
A. THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE RE-
SULT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME 
AND THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF ALAND. FR'ANDSEN, AND 
THEREFORE APPELLANTS SUSTAINED 
NO DAMAGE. 
E. APPELLANTS WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF 
BREACH BY PROCEEDING TO TRIAL 
WITHOUT OBJECTION. 
The Appellants contend initially that the court 
erred in the pretrial order in not ruling that they 
had a cause of action because the Respondent failed ' 
to handle their case and thereby breached his con-
tract. It is submitted the trial court acted properly. ' 
It is well settled that where a client seeks dam· 
ages from his attorney for malpractice or breach 
of contract he has the burden of sustaining his cause 
of action as well as his damages, Collins vs. Wanner, 
382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963); Anno. 45 ALR 2d 5, 14. 
'The appellants have Jt,eferred to depositions in their brief. 
However, these are not a part of the record on appeal a!1d 
there is no evidence that they were considered by the tnal 
court. 
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It was incumbent upon Appellants to demonstrate 
the breach and the damages. The record is silent on 
the issue except for the pretrial order. However, 
assuming that the Appellants hired Mr. Bridwell 
and not the association of Bridwell and Frandsen, 
the trial court found not negligence on the part of 
Mr. Frandsen in handling the case, and Appellants 
have not objected to that ruling. No evidence sup-
ports the conclusion that the damages the Appel-
lantsnow seek would have been avoided. Mr. Frand-
sen diligently pursued the court's ruling at the time 
of trial on the lease problem seeking to change the 
result. The trial indicated he was convinced of his 
position "as a matter of law". In no way is it ex-
plained how the Respondent's appearance and argu-
ment of the ma~r in place of Mr. Frandsen would 
have changed the trial court's ruling. After judg-
ment was entered in Civil No. 132929, additional 
counsel sought to set aside the judgment and was 
, not successful. Appellants now seek damages they 
contend resulted from the breach. Appellants do 
, not seek return of a fee, but contend, in effect, that 
the trial court erred and that they are entitled to 
the damages flowing from that error. There is no 
evidence whatsoever that the damages they seek 
are the proximate result of the breach by Respon-
dent. Appellants really are seeking special damages 
for the alleged breach, and in such circumstances it 
is basic law that the damages must be shown to have 
occurred due to the breach of the employment con-
ti·act. Hadley vs. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 [1854] ; 
7 
! 
McCormick, Damages §§ 138, 139. There is no show. : 
ing that if Respondent had perforrned4 Appel- I 
lant's position would be any different. There being : 
no negligence on the part of Frandsen and no indi-
1 
cation that Respondent's performance would have I 
c..:hanged the result, the trial court correctly disre- ! 
garded the claim of breach of contract. See Anno. • 
45 ALR 2d 5, 30. 
Since the record reveals that Appellants went 
to trial with Mr. Frandsen without any objection 
or protest they have waived any right to contend 
Respondent was the sole counsel. There is a pre- i 
sumption that an attorney appearing for a party 
is authorized to appear and the contrary fact must 
be shown by clear and convincing proof. 7 Arn. Jur. I 
2d, Attorneys at Law § 113, 116. Nothing appears ; 
of record to support the Appellants' contention 
Frandsen was not authorized to represent them. No 
objection was made at trial that Respondent alone 
was Appellants' counsel. It has been acknowledged 
by this Court that a client may ratify or acquiesce 
in the employment of associate counsel, Skeen vs. 
Peterson, 113 Utah 483, 196 P.2d 708 (1948). Sup· , 
porting a claim of ratification or acquiescence in 
this case is the fact of Frandsen preparing and sign· 
ing the Notice of Readiness for Trial (A), his ap-
pearance at pretrial and his conduct of the trial, , 
' Respondent does not admit that the Appellants' factual con-
tentions are true but only assui.e,es the H f 1 H' : state-
ments for this appeal. 
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' the fact that Judgment was entered in Civil No. 
132929 on 26 February, 1963, Satisfaction of Judg-
ment made on 4 December, 1963, and the fact that 
the Motion to Strike the Judgment and for a new 
hearing was not made by new counsel until 24 Jan-
uary, 1964. These facts would tend to support a 
claim of acquiescence and ratification, Re Laacivita, 
255 F.2d 365 (3rd Cir. 1958); Yarnall vs. York-
shire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d 192 
( 1952), and when weighed against the presumption 
of authority and the absence of rebutting evidence 
of record, it is clear Appellants have no claim for 
breach of contract. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' AC-
TION. 
A. RESPONDENT HAD NO DUTY TO AP-
PEAL. 
B. RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT COULD NOT 
BE DEEMED NEGLIGENT IN VIEW OF 
THE STATE OF THE LAW IN UTAH. 
C. IT CANNOT BE SAID AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE CASE WOULD HA VE 
BEEN REVllSED ON APPEAL. 
The Appellants' second contention is that Re-
spondent should have advised them that the trial 
court's decision in Civil No. 132929 could be ap-
pealed. This contention is inappropriate when ex-
amined in light of the facts in the instant case, and 
9 
that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that . 
the trial court committed prejudicial error. I 
I 
It is well settled in this state that an attorney I 
is under no obligation to pursue an appeal on behalf 
of his client unless there has been some agreement 
or indication from the client that the attorney is 
to represent him on appeal. In Lundberg vs. Back-
man, 11 Utah 2d 330, 358 P.2d 987 ( 1961), this 
court ruled that an attorney hired to represent a 
party in a lawsuit was not obligated to undertake 
an appeal on behalf of the party absent an addition-
al agreement encompassing such representation. 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that 
there was ever any discussion between the Appel-
lants and Respondent relative to prosecuting an 
appeal. The Appellants' Complaint filed in the trial 
court expressly states that Appellants hired Respon-
dent for the purposes of prosecuting an action in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. Under these circumstances Respondent had 
no obligation towards the Appellants with reference 
to an appeal. As this court noted in the Backman 
case: 
"Before Mr. Backman could be liable for 
failure to perfect an appeal in time, he would 
have to owe to her a duty to prosecute s~ch 
an appeal for her. This duty does not arise 
from mere employment of Mr. Backman by 
Appellant to represent her in defense of a case 
in the District Court." 
IO 
This court recognized that the obligation of an 
attorney terminates with the entry of the judgment 
in Sandall vs. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093. 
Since the Backman case seems to recognize that 
there was no duty flowing from Appellants to Re-
spondent with an appellate process, it is submitted 
that there was no duty upon the Respondent to make 
an appraisal as to the likelihood of a successful ap-
peal, in the absence of a request by the client that 
he do so. In Hawkeye Security Insurance Company 
vs. Indemnity Insurance Company, 260 F.2d 361 
(10th Cir. 1958), the court noted that the deter-
mination of whether an appeal should be taken is a 
question for the prinicpal, or the client. This being 
so, in the absence of some request on behalf of the 
client for the attorney's advice relevant to taking 
an appeal, the attorney is under no oblf.tion or duty 
to volunteer such advice. 
It is submitted that even if the court were to 
determine that in some instances an attorney was 
under an obligation to appraise his client as to ap-
peal possibilities in the absence of a request by the 
client, this is not such a case. The Appellants in 
Point II of their brief cite no decisions from the 
State of Utah controlling or relevant to the issues 
they claim were incorrectly decided in the trial 
court. Further, as it will be seen later on, there ap-
pears to be a division of authority that might be ap-
plicable to the instant case. An attorney is not ob-
' ligated to know with exactness the law, and certain-
11 
ly where there is no decision from the highest coun 
in the state it cannot be assumed that he can make 
a positive statement that a client should pursue an 
appeal on penalty of being found guilty of rnalprac- , 
tice. As Chief Justice Abbott noted in M ontriou vs. 
Jefferies, 2 C & P 113 ( 1825) : 
"No attorney is bound to know all the 
law. God forbid that it should even be imag-
ined that an attorney or a counsel or even a 
judge is bound to know all the law." 
As noted inHodges vs. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 
80 S. E. 2d 144 (1954): 
"An attorney who acts in good faith and 
in an honest belief that his advice and acts 
are well founded and in the best interest of • 
his client is not answerable for a mere error . 
of judgment or for a mistake in a point of law . 
which has not been settled by the court of last 
resort in his State and on which reasonable 
doubt may be entertained by well-informed · 
lawyers." 
A similar conclusion was reached in Collins vs. , 
Wanner, 382 P.2d 105, (Okla. 19"J.)It is submitted, 1 
therefore, that in the absence of a request by the 
Appellant for an appraisal of the chances on ap-
peal or in the absence of a clear-cut holding from : 
this court that reversal was in order, the Respon· ' 
dent owed no diity to advise the Appellants in the · 
manner they claim they should have been advised. I 
It is well settled that an attorney, like .a do?tor, I 
is not an insurer of a good result for his client, ! 
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Babbitt vs. Bompas, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417 
( 1889) ; 45 ALR 2d 5, 12, 13. Even if it could be 
said an attorney employed under an agreement for 
the prosecution of the trial of a case owes a duty to 
the client relating to an appeal, the facts of this 
case do not show any negligence. In 45 ALR 2d 5, 
15, it is observed: 
"In accordance with the general rule dis-
cussed supra, § 3 [a], that an attorney is li-
able only for the possession of ordinary and 
reasonable skill and knowledge, it has fre-
quently been held that a lawyer is not liable 
for lack of knowledge as to the true state of 
the law where a doubtful or debatable point 
is involved.') 
A lead case is Spangler vs. Sellers, 5 Fed. 882, 
887 (C.C.SD. Ohio 1881) where the court clearly 
stated the standard of care applicable to attorneys. 
"It did not require of him the possession 
of perfect legal knowledge, and the highest 
degree of skill in relation to business of that 
character, nor that he would conduct it with 
the greatest degree of diligence, care, and 
prudence. But it required that he should pos-
sess the ordinary legal knowledge and skill 
common to members of the profession; and 
that, in the discharge of the duties he had 
assumed, he would be ordinarily and reason-
ably diligent, careful and prudJIBt." 
In Roady and Andersen, Professional Negli-
gence, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence 
(Wade) P.222, it is observed: 
"There has been universal agreement 
13 
that a lawyer is not an insurer or guarantor 
of the correctness of his work or of the re-
sults which will be attained. He is liable only 
for negligent failure to use the requisite care 
or skill." 
and p. 225: 
"On the other hand if the state of the 
law is uncertain or doubtful, or if there is a 
disagreement among attorneys ~hen it is 
very unlikely that an attorney will be found 
negligent. In this connection, it may be rele-
vant that the lower court agreed with the 
attorney or that he sought the advice of an-
other attorney before taking his action.'' 
Some cases have indicated that an attorney 
cannot be deemed negligent by relying on the trial 
court or magistrate's assertion of the law, Pearson ! 
vs. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227, 259 (1858); Hart vs. 
Frame, 6 Cl. & F. 193, 7 Eng. Rep. 670 (H.L. Sc. 
1839). It is submitted therefore in the absence of 
a special duty to analyze the law in this case rela-
tive to appeal it could not be said that Respondent 
was negligent. 5 Therefore, it cannot be claimed the , 
Respondent's conduct in this case relative to advis-
ing or not advising Appellants to appeal was negli-
gence. 
Of relevance to the issues of duty, negligence, 1 
and causation is the question of whether the de· 
• One District Judge, now a Justice of the Supreme Court, 
and the trial Judge that heard this case feel that the law 
was sufficiently against Appellants' position to preclude 
recovery. 
14 
cision of the trial court would have been reversed 
with certaintly on an appeal in No. 132929. As the 
Appellants correctly note in their brief, in any event 
they must demonstrate that the decision in No. 
132929 would have been reversed on appeal. Pete vs. 
Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 
(1954); Better Homes, Inc. vs. Rodgers, 195 F. 
Supp. 93 (D.C. W. Va. 1961). 
The facts in No. 132929 viewed most favorably 
to Respondent show that the lease read: 
"The Lessee shall have the option to ex-
tend said lease for an additi'onal five years, 
from August 10, 1962 to August 10, 1967, 
on the same terms and conditions as in the 
original lease, except the rental payment 
thereof. In the event that the parties hereto 
cannot agree upon the rent to be paid for the 
extended option period, then the rental shall 
be submitted to arbitration. Each of the par-
ties hereto shall select an arbitrator and these 
two arbitrators shall select a third to deter-
mine the said rental. The rental determined 
by the said board of three arbitrators shall 
be binding upon both parties hereto." 
Note the lease refers to extended period and 
provides for arbitration if agreement can't be reach-
ed, thus lending emphasis to a position that the lease 
was really a 10-year lease with a right to terminate 
after five years. Prior to the expiration of the lease, 
on July 23, 1962 (A) Respondent sent a letter to 
Mr. and Mrs. F. Hyde Mortensen advising them 
that Appellants wanted $450.00 per month for the 
15 
next five years or Mortensens should quit the pre-
mises. On July 30, 1962, Mr. Bernard L. Rose, rep-
resenting Mortensens, replied that they elected to 
continue their lease at $150.00 per month and indi-
cated they would seek arbitration. Thereafter, Ap-
pellants accepted the $150.00 payments and never 
name an arbitrator nor apparently requested arbi-
tration. In Civil No. 132929 the court concluded this 
acceptance of rent at the old amount resulted in a 
renewal at the same terms. 
'The Appellants cite cases to the effect that al-
lowing the lessee to retain possession and accepting 
rents does not renew the lease. These cases are not 
aplicable. Here, the timely election of the Morten-
sens continued the lease, not the hold over and ac-
ceptance of rents. The Court found lessees not other-
wise in default, and the Appellants do not contest 
this aspect of the court's finding in Civil No. 
132929. A reading of the cases cited by Appellants 
amply demonstrates they are inapplicable here. The 
question then is: Was the acceptance a renewal at 
the $150.00 figure? Since Appellants accepted the 
rents as paid by Mortensens, a clear basis existed 
for holding a renewal was intended. In Tay-Hol-
brook, Inc. vs. Tutt, 24 P.2d 463 (Cal. 1933), the 
court held that by holding over and accepting rent, 
the formalities for renewal of a lease, called for in 
the lease, were waived. 
The conduct of the Appellants would clearly in· 
dicate a waiver of their right to arbitrate. Stephen 
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vs. Union Assurance Society, 16 Utah 22, 50 Pac. 
626 (1897); 5 Am. Jur. 2d. Arbitration and Award 
§§ 51-53. It is submitted, therefore, the trial court's 
decision in Civil No. 132929 is not clearly erroneous, 
nor that of the court below in the case now before 
this court, and Respondent was not guilty of negli-
gence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants' contentions when examined in 
light of the evidence and the law indicate only that 
they are dissatisfied with the results of their law-
suit. There is no basis to say the court below erred, 
and this court should affirm the trial court judg-
ment dismissing the lawsuit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR. 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Respondent 
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